台灣民政府公布美機密檔案台灣實相2
Taiwan in Truth
【台灣實相內容由美國國家機密檔案室提供。】
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d.The Economist, on May 21, published a short note regarding the "Ownerless Isle", that is Taiwan.
e.If the American Government still wishes to save anything from the wreck of its China policy, the unsettled status of Formosa in international law would afford a ground for treating the island as a separate entity, even if recognition were given to a Communist regime as the Government of China.
7.Telegram from the Consul at Taipei (Edgar) to the Secretary of State
Taipei, June 8, 1949
K.C. Wu again looking well called on me on return from tour of Formosa. Highly encouraged by findings, believes Formosa can hold out with minimum troops since coastline is so easily defended. His impressions are that Formosans are loyal Chinese although anti-Nationalist Government, that they fear undisciplined soldiers and are uncertain of holding their jobs.
8.Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs
(Butterworth) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)
Washington, June 9, 1949
a. At a meeting yesterday afternoon attended by Mr. Sandifer and Mr. Gerig, it was tentatively agreed that the most promising United Nations action which could be taken to deal with the urgent problem of Formosa was to request a special meeting of the General Assembly early this summer. The request would be accompanied by a full statement of the United States position, including an explanation of the basis for revoking, in part at least, the Cairo Declaration, and making plain that the United Nations' action envisioned was to call for and supervise an election on the Island in which the people of Formosa could vote on a return to the Mainland or some alternative trusteeship arrangement pending their qualification for independence.
b.An alternative and more appealing procedure would be to have the United States, preferably in company with several other friendly and interested powers, request a special session of the General Assembly to consider the problem of Forsoma, with the recommendation that a plebiscite be held on Formosa under the supervision of the United Nations in order to enable the people of Formosa to express their wished as to their future status.
c.This request to the United Nations would explain in some detail the responsibility which the United States feels toward the people of Formosa. It should also forthrightly point out that the post-war conditions in so far as Formosa is concerned, as envisaged at the time of the Declaration of Cairo, have not in fact materialized and that the record of misrule by the Chinese authorities on the Island requires that the people themselves should have the opportunity to decide their own destiny.
d.As a party to the Cairo Declaration, the British Government should be immediately informed of the direction of our thinking with a view to securing parallel action and the concurrent issuance by it of a similar statement.
e.There are disadvantages to this course. The Formosans might vote to return to China. While improbable, the risk has to be recognized.
f.The moral position of the United States would seem to be unassailable.
Subannex-Tab "A"
PROPOSED STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE AT TIME UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT REQUESTS SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
(This statement would be accompanied by a White Paper on the subject of Formosa)
The United States Government with the support of the Governments of the United Kingdom has requested the immediate calling for a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations to consider the problem of Formosa toward the people of which Island, the United States feels an especial responsibility by reason of the part it played in the liberation of the Island.
At the special session of the General Assembly, the United States Government will propose that a free and secret plebiscite be held on the Island under the supervision of a United Nations Commission, in order to enable the people of Formosa to express their wishes with respect to a return to China or some alternative under which they would assume independence either immediately or after some preparatory period of United Nations trusteeship.
Under the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, to which both the United States and the United Kingdom were parties, the intention was expressed to restore to the Republic of China the territories, such as Manchuria and Formosa, which had earlier been lost to Japan.
The Cairo Declaration, however, further declared that the determination of the final status of Formosa must await the conclusion of a peace settlement for Japan. Having watched with mounting concern the misrule of Formosa by the Chinese governing authorities since VJ Day, the United States has reached the conclusion that the Chinese Government has forfeited the right to a perfunctory confirmation of sovereignty at the time of concluding a peace settlement with Japan, and that the people of Formosa are entitled to express freely and by secret ballot, their desires with respect to their own destiny.
The United States Government has no designs on Formosa. It does not seek military bases or special privileges of any character whatsoever on the Island. The United States Government, however, is rightfully concerned for the peace, prosperity and future of those whose home is on Formosa, and in conformity with its traditional espousal of the principle of self-determination, is laying before the United Nations the proposal described above.
9.Telegram from the Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State Nanking, June 10, 1949
Fugh drew inference from Huang's subsequent remarks that latter hoped that I could be persuaded to recommend to Department that public statement be made about legal aspects of island and thus discourage Generalissimo from establishing base there.
10.Telegram from the Consul General at Tientsin (Smyth) to the Secretary of
State Tientsin, June 21, 1949
Growing discussion among Chinese here re Formosa indicates misunderstanding its status. Many believe it virtually US territory, administered indirectly by MacArthur. Though many better educated disagree, average Chinese believes US considers Formosa of prime importance to Pacific defense line and that its "loss" would be serious blow. Result is widespread feeling US will not "let Formosa go" at any cost.
11.A POSSIBLE COURSE OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO FORMOSA AND THE PESCADORES Washington, June 23, 1949
Preliminary Comment
A. Any plan for the removal of the present authorities on Formosa and the Pescadores immediately encounters two serious obstacles:
a.There are now approximately 300,000 Chinese troops on the islands, who might resist such action and
b.this Government is more or less committed to Chinese sovereignty over the islands.這個政府(美國政府)多少想要讓中國主權及於該島.
B.......our hands are more or less tied by the commitments we made at Cairo and our actions in facilitating Chinese assumption of control over the islands. ......
...... the Philippines recollect that it was only recently invaded and ravaged from those islands; ...... they therefore propose that the powers which are still legally at war with Japan should immediately concern themselves with the threatened turmoil in this part of the Japanese Empire which is still awaiting final disposition at a peace settlement; under Article 107 of the United Nations Charter, this question is reserved for action by the powers which are at war with Japan.
......., the proposal should be made that, in view of the independent early history of Formosa and the Pescadores, of the shocking record of misrule during the past four years by the Chinese and of the many pleas from representative Formosans for autonomy, the powers which defeated Japan should promptly request the U.N. to conduct within one year a plebiscite regarding the ultimate disposition of the islands in accordance with the principles of self-determination.
C................, this Government should announce publicly our reaction to the notification:
(1)The final disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores, parts of the former Japanese Empire, awaits a decision at a peace settlement with Japan;
(2)Formosa and the Pescadores are at present under Chinese military administration because the United States Government enabled, the Chinese authorities at the time of the Japanese surrender to assume control over the islands, the decision to do this having flowed from the attitude expressed by the President in the Cairo Declaration;
(3)It was certainly not the intention of the American people, whose forces liberated Formosa and the Pescadores at so great a cost in blood and treasure, that the Cairo Declaration and this Government's action in facilitating Chinese control of the islands should have resulted in the creation of a menace to the stability and security of Southeast Asia and in the suffering which has been endured by the people of Formosa during the past four years;
(4)Hoping that the Chinese administration on the islands might turn to more responsible and constructive policies, this Government has during the past four years scrupulously refrained from giving publicity to conditions on the islands and to the appeals for liberation made by representative Formosans to this Government;
(5)In view of all the foregoing, this Government declares its willingness to associate itself with the decision of the majority of the concerned powers regarding
(a) the occupation and administration of the islands pending their disposition at a Japanese peace settlement and
(b) the future political status of the islands based upon the results of the proposed plebiscite.
D.We should attempt to obtain an agreed position with all of them excepting the Russians and Chinese regarding the change in the occupation and administration of the islands, acquainting our friends of our willingness to carry the main weight of the military phase of the operation. To minimize the unilateral appearance of this operation, we should urge the Filipinos, Australians, Indians, Pakistanis, Canadians and New Zealanders to make at least token forces available for the military operation.
E.At the same time, we should seek the collaboration of the Filipinos in providing all possible facilities for Formosan autonomy groups to make their case known both on the islands and elsewhere through broadcasts, publications, and other channels.
F.The Generalissimo should be informed that if he wishes to remain on the island, he will be accorded the status of a political refugee.
G.During the take-over and the subsequent administration of the island, we should avoid so far as possible a conspicuous role. We should always remember thatour aim is more to deny the islands to the Communists than to acquire responsibility for them and that our influence can be far more effectively exerted through indirect and discreet means rather than through unilateral heavy-handed measures.( 未完待續 )
台灣民政府 秘書長 林 志昇
2015/04/26
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