台灣民政府公布美機密檔案台灣實相3
Taiwan in Truth
【台灣實相內容由美國國家機密檔案室提供。】
( 接續 )
於1951年9月8日簽署，1952年4月28日生效，於1960年6月23日因美日間之「安保條約(Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security)」生效，而失效之「美日共同安全條約(U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty)」，其Article 4之條文所提及之「日本區域(the Japan area)」其實是有包括台灣。
結論：
1.日本人在13世紀時已開始在福爾摩沙島活動，直至德川幕府於1633年實施鎖國政策，禁止日本人赴海外發展。荷蘭人是獲日本幕府許可，得以在1624年8月間，自澎湖轉進至福爾摩沙島佔領，直至1662年被鄭成功政權取代。台灣自古屬日本而非中國，中國官方及至1683年才開始經營福爾摩沙島，然成效有限。
因此，福爾摩沙島之政權輪替軌跡，可說是日本於1624年讓與荷蘭，荷蘭是於1662年讓與鄭成功，鄭氏王朝是於1683年讓與大清帝國，大清帝國是於1895年讓與日本，這其中之「讓與」，其實是戰爭法中所謂的「征服與割讓」之意思，日本則於1945年4月1日依照國際法實施憲法，將台灣正式編入為日本國土之一部份。然自1945年10月25日起，因敗戰而被中國人佔領至今。日本是最早經營福爾摩沙島，也是唯一建構完整福爾摩沙島主權的國家。基於「萬國公法」完全適用於日本國土一部份之福爾摩沙島，其並非如英國「Economist雜誌」於1949年5月21日，所定位之「無主島(Ownerless Isle)」，錯誤認知台灣和日本間之法理關係，致使台灣地位成為真實版「羅生門」之主要原因。
2.美國對於中國在台灣「完成整合及復甦經濟」失敗，感到失望，從而並不排除將台灣歸還日本之可能性。
3.日本投降後，台灣是由中國佔領當局執行盟軍分配佔領，行政長官人選之決定並不在美國權限內。在天津的中國人之間，對台灣是議論紛紛，許多人認為台灣地位實際上是麥克阿瑟將軍間接治理下之美國領土，然，為錯誤認知。
4.陳誠是在台灣佔領，並無遭受共產黨立即威脅之情勢下，頒布台灣戒嚴令。目的應是讓已下野之蔣中正先生，不是以「蔣總裁流亡」而是以「蔣元帥佔領」之名義，堂堂正正轉進日本台灣佔領。
5.日本台灣並無依開羅公報歸還中國，在共產中國強力介入韓戰後，中國已經失去不侵略鄰國承諾，以致讓開羅宣言失其效力。台灣最終地位必須等待簽署對日和約才能決定，而美國是無可爭論，對所解放之台灣有特殊責任。
6.中國人是在美國之默許下「流亡而非移民」至台灣。因此，在台海兩岸之中國人完成和解後（簽署ECFA），美國有責任設法處理已無流亡正當性之中國難民。
7.美國在對日和約簽署前，曾計劃訴諸武力，移除中國對日本台灣之佔領。美國原有計劃慫恿菲律賓、澳洲、印度、巴基斯坦、加拿大及紐西蘭，至少象徵性出兵，以配合美國移除中國佔領政權之軍事行動。事實上，美國可以親自執行台灣佔領，讓台灣得以免於淪為中國統治之最佳保證。
8.美國政府基於「開羅宣言」之承諾，多少想要讓中國主權及於台灣。一方面，曾考慮讓台灣由聯合國託管後，依公投以自決獨立或和中國合併，另一方面，卻擔憂台灣人會支持回歸中國，儘管是不可能，然而必須承認有此風險。
9.所有美國對台灣之構想，均因韓戰爆發而破滅。韓戰一方面是救了蔣介石，另一方面卻是誤了台灣地位正常化。
10. 美國遠東事務辦公室主任Butterworth，明知中華民國並不擁有台灣主權，卻支持本質為「中國民政府」之台灣省政府，逾越戰爭法權限，向佔領地人民徵稅，自1949年4月14日起，在日本台灣佔領地實施「台灣省私有耕地租用辦法」，亦即所謂「三七五減租」土地改革政策。依戰爭慣例，佔領國「軍或民」政府是只能在「個別關稅領土(Separate Customs Territory)」架構內，設立「海關(customhouse)」，對進出口貨品「課以關稅(tariff)」，不能逕行向佔領地人民徵稅，移轉國民公法之國民納稅義務，也不能施行土地改革政策，移轉佔領地人民原本之財產所有權。
11.早在1949年6月間，美國有鑑於中國佔領當局自日本投降日以來，在台灣不當治理，美國已決定中國政府已喪失在與日本簽訂和平條約時，循例確認台灣主權之權利。
12.美國方面雖明知台灣人憎惡「腐敗且無能」之中國佔領當局，然基於反共，無選擇餘地，必須在外交及經濟上予以支持，確保台灣不致淪為共產黨統治。
在美國的認知中，台灣讓中國國民黨統治至少比讓中國共產黨統治好些。
13.美國政府對台灣並無企圖、但有原則，就是「不能落入共產黨控制」，以致一方面接受雖然是「腐敗且無能」，然而是「反共且親美」之中國佔領當局，並期待其能推行更負責任及建設性之政策。而另一方面，則是在過去四年中謹慎地避免公開島內情形，及台灣人代表向美國政府之訴請解放。
14.如果未來本土台灣人讓台灣國際地位正常化運動行使，將會是美國國家利益，美國方面需要和有潛力之本土台灣人領袖保持謹慎的接觸。
15.美國方面認為本土台灣人如想實質享有充分之自治，就應加強、且儘速參與島內政治，承擔治理責任。
台灣民政府 秘書長 林志昇
2015/04/27
12.Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Consul at Taipei (Edgar)
Washington, June 30, 1949
Dept fully aware liability excess troops constitute on Taiwan but unwilling intervene formally with Governor on military matter, responsibility for which is Chinese.
13. Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan)
Washington, July 6, 1949
This memorandum, according to an attached chit, was canceled on July 6, 1949; a note stated that the views of the policy Planning Staff would be submitted by Mr. Kennan in a personal memorandum; latter not found in Department of State files.
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD FORMOSA AND THE PESCADORES
A.It would now seem clear that the only reasonably sure chance of denying Formosa and the Pescadores to the Communists and insulating the islands from mainland authority would lie in the removal of the present Nationalist administration from the islands and in the establishment of a provisional international or U.S. regime which would invoke the principle of self-determination for the islanders and would eventually, prior to a Japanese peace settlement, conduct a plebiscite to determine the ultimate disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores. Formosan separatism is the only concept which has sufficient grass-roots appeal to resist communism.
B.There are two ways in which this change in regime could conceivably be brought about.
a.One would be to induce other Far Eastern powers to take the lead in initiating international action to achieve the above purpose.
b.The other would be to announce a temporary unilateral reassertion of authority over the islands on the grounds that subsequent events had invalidated all the assumptions underlying the Cairo Declaration and that U.S. intervention was required by the interests of stability in the Pacific area as well as by the interests of the inhabitants of the islands.
Either would confront us with the eventual probable responsibility for removing the Chinese forces and many of the Chinese refugees by force to the mainland. This would involve a considerable amount of pushing people around, which would be unpleasant and might lead to serious moral conflicts within our own people and government.
The second alternative would offend the sensibilities of many people in the Department on legal and procedural grounds, and we would probably have to cut some legal corners to justify it.
C.All the advice I can get in the Department tells me that both of these possible courses should be rejected and that we should reconcile ourselves to the prospect of Formosa's falling into the hands of the Chinese Communists. I personally feel that if the second course were to be adopted and to be carried through with sufficient resolution, speed, ruthlessness and self-assurance, the way Theodore Roosevelt might have done it, it would be not only successful but would have an electrifying effect in this country and throughout the Far East. I have nothing to support this view but my own instinct.
D.My feeling is, therefore, that at this stage you should discuss this with the President and your colleagues in the National Security Council, and should make plain to them that the courses outlined above seem to be the only alternative to eventual Chinese Communist rule on the islands.
14.Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) Washington, July 27, 1949
In response to a suggestion recently made to the American Consul at Taipei by one of the Governor's close advisors, I desire to present to you certain considerations which have been of concern to the Government of the United States of America with respect to the administration of the Island of Taiwan. It is unnecessary. I am sure, to remind your excellency of the special interest of this Government in that Island arising from the part which American armed forces played in its liberation, as well as from the fact that the final determination of the Island's status necessarily awaits a peace settlement with Japan.
Unhappily, the history of Chinese administration since VJ Day in Taiwan has fallen far short of the hopes of its people and of the expection of the United States at the time that administrative responsibility was turned over to the Republic of China.
In a spirit of friendly advice, there are listed below certain measures of self-help which the United States believes are necessary of achievement for the tranquility of Taiwan.
Firstly, and foremost, it would seem that the numbers of civilian emigres and mainland troops which have come to the Island in recent months should be reduced to the maximum extent possible .......
Secondly, it would seem that a concerted effort is necessary to stabilize the value of the Island's currency and thereby halt the inflation which by all reports has so drastically disrupted the economy of the Island in recent months. Such measures should include the increased taxes and improved tax collections methodto the end that all governmental expenditures, including those on behalf of the National Government, would be covered by revenue; ..........
Fourthly, the land reform measures already instituted should be pushed forward vigrously and expanded to the end that tenancy is reduced and the net return of the individual producer increased.
Finally, if the natives of Taiwan are to enjoy in fact the progressive achievement of their understandable and legitimate aspiration for an enlarging measures of self-government, then they must be increasinglyand promptly brought into the political life of the Island and into position of responsibility in its administration.
15. Memorandum by the Department of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) Washington, August 4, 1949
Subject: Current Position of the U.S. With Respect to Formosa
A.Developments in Formosa since our present policy was determined upon make it desirable now to reexamine our situation.
B.To attain our main objective with respect to Formosa and the Pescadores-the denial of the islands to Communist control-current policy directives, as set forth in NSC 37/2, 94 and NSC 37/5, 95 call for
(1)developing and supporting a local non-Communist Chinese regime which will provide at least a modicum of decent government for the islands,
(2)discouraging the further influx of mainland Chinese, and
(3)maintaining discreet contact with potential native Formosan leaders in the event that some future use of a Formosan autonomous movement should be in the United States national interest.
C.The Governor of Formosa was informed of the serious view the United States took of the continued influx of refugee civilians and demoralized troops.
D.We face on Formosa today a situation analogous to that which confronted us on the mainland of China a year ago. The government in power is corrupt and incompetent. It lacks the will to take the necessary political and economic steps to modify the deep and growing resentment of the Formosans.
Moreover, economic aid from outside cannot in the absence of a basic change in the government alter or cure this situation, and so long as it endures, the ultimate passage of Formosa under Communist control, by external or internal action, appears probable.
IV.Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles A. Fraleigh of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs Washington, December 28, 1951
The representatives of Defense indicated that the phrase "Japan area" in the JCS draft was intended to be vague, and to permit the United States to argue that hostilities affecting Formosa, Sakhalin or Korea would be hostilities affecting "the Japan area".
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